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“NO EXISTIRA LA PENA DE MUERTE”:
DOES THE UNITED STATES VIOLATE
REGIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW BY
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON
CITIZENS OF PUERTO RICO?
INTRODUCTION

O

n July 31, 2003, after three days of deliberations, a San
Juan jury composed of seven men and five women ended
the federal trial that set off a clash between the United States
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.1 The defendants, Hector Oscar Acosta-Martinez (a.k.a “Gordo”) and Joel RiveraAlejandro were acquitted of the charges of abduction and murder of Jorge Hernandez-Diaz, a grocery-store owner.2 The two
men faced a penalty of death in the first capital trial in Puerto
Rico in more than seventy-five years.3
4
Puerto Rico effectively abolished the death penalty in 1929
and later incorporated the prohibition in its constitution, which
was ratified by the U.S. Congress in 19525 and states: “The
6
Death Penalty shall not exist.” Despite this prohibition, the
Department of Justice continues to seek the death penalty in
cases arising under the jurisdiction conferred to it by the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 and the “Memorandum of Understanding” between the local authorities and the local United
States Attorney’s office.7
1. John-Thor Dahlburg, Acquittals Quash a US Bid for Death Penalties in
Puerto Rico, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at A24; Leonard Post, A Clash of Cultures, THE NAT’L LAW J., July 23, 2003.
2. Dahlburg, supra note 1.
3. The last time the death penalty was applied in Puerto Rico was in 1927
when a man was hanged for the murder of his boss. Ivan Roman, Not-guilty
Verdict Thwarts Death Penalty Battle: The Case had Sparked a Fight about
whether Federal Law on Capital Punishment Trumps Puerto Rico’s Ban on it,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 1, 2003, at A3.
4. 34 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 995 (1929).
5. Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 33 (2000).
6. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7 (“No existirá la pena de muerte.”).
7. United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 312 n.1 (D. P.R.
2000) [hereinafter Acosta Martinez I] (citing Rory K. Little, The Federal Death
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To place the present controversy in context, Part I of this note
consists of a discussion of the evolution of the political relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico, as well as
Puerto Rico’s ban on capital punishment. Part II discusses the
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994. Part III examines in detail
the recent challenges to the applicability of the death penalty to
Puerto Rico by defendants Acosta-Martinez and RiveraAlejandro. Part IV of this note will show that the abolition of
the death penalty has become a norm of regional customary law
in the Latin American region and will argue that the U.S. Attorney’s office violates these regional norms by imposing its
views of capital punishment on a Latin population which has
expressly and unequivocally rejected the ultimate punishment.
I. PUERTO RICO’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND
THE APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO PUERTO
8
RICO
On December 10, 1898, the United States and Spain signed
the Treaty of Paris which officially ended the Spanish-American
War.9 As a result of this treaty, the island of Puerto Rico became a territory of the United States.10 In 1900, the Foraker
Act11 introduced a civilian government on the island appointed
12
The citizens of the island were not
by the U.S. President.
granted U.S. citizenship until the Jones Act of 191713 which also

Penalty: History and Some Thoughts about the Department of Justice’s Role,
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 357 n.36 (1999)) (“Because violent crime is unfortunately prevalent in Puerto Rico, the local authorities have entered into a
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ with the local US Attorney’s office, agreeing
that the federal authorities will prosecute much of the ‘local’ violent crime,
such as car-jackings, in Puerto Rico.”).
8. See generally Malavet, supra note 5.
9. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 1 P.R. LAWS ANN. 16 (1999).
10. Id. at art. 2 (“Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico
and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the
island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.”).
11. Foraker Act, ch. 191, 131 Stat. 77 (1900), 1 P.R. LAWS ANN. 24–48
(1999).
12. Malavet, supra note 5, at 24. The members of the local cabinet were
also appointed by the President, as well as the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. Id.
13. Jones Act of 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917).
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changed the local government rule and gave the governor of the
island the right to appoint his cabinet, with the advice and consent of the local senate.14 The new citizens, however, were not
afforded the same constitutional protections as U.S. citizens
residing on the mainland.15
Thirty-three years after the Jones Act, on July 3, 1950, the
U.S. Congress passed Public Law 600.16 The act was “adopted
in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may
organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own
adoption.”17 It purported to “fully” recognize “the principle of
18
government by consent.” Public Law 600 was submitted to the
people of Puerto Rico and accepted by them in a referendum
held on June 4, 1951.19 Pursuant to Public Law 600, a constitutional convention convened in Puerto Rico and adopted a constitution which was approved by Congress on July 3, 1952.20
In March 1953, the United States sent a memorandum to the
Secretary General of the United Nations regarding Puerto
Rico’s new status.21 The memorandum stated that “at the request of the people of Puerto Rico and with the approval of the
Government of the United States, Puerto Rico has voluntarily
entered into the relationship with the United States that it has
chosen to describe as a ‘commonwealth’ relationship.”22 The
memorandum stated that because of Puerto Rico’s new status
and based on the principles of self-determination and government by consent, the United States was no longer required to
14. Malavet, supra note 5, at 27.
15. Id. For example, in Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that the right to trial by jury did not apply to U.S.
citizens residing in Puerto Rico. Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,
309 (1922).
16. Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 313.
20. Public Law 447, July 3, 1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327, reprinted in 1 P.R.
LAWS ANN. 138–39 (1999).
21. Memorandum by the government of the United States of America Concerning the Cessation of Transmission of Information under Article 73(e) of
the Charter with Regard to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Apr. 20, 1953,
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 1953, at 584–85 [hereinafter Memorandum Concerning Transmission of Information]. See also Malavet, supra note
5, at 35.
22. Memorandum Concerning Transmission of Information, supra note 21.
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report information concerning Puerto Rico to the United Nations, in compliance with Article 73(e) of the United Nations
Charter.23 The General Assembly of the United Nations subsequently passed a resolution accepting the new U.S. position regarding its reporting requirements under the Charter.24
Before Puerto Rico officially became a commonwealth of the
United States, it passed a law in 1929 abolishing capital punishment.25 Puerto Rico thereafter enshrined the prohibition in
its highest document, its Constitution, in 1952.26 Although
Congress had amended the Constitution of Puerto Rico before
approving it and returning it for ratification by the citizens of
Puerto Rico, it allowed the phrase “The death penalty shall not
exist” to remain in the text of the Constitution.27
23. See id.; the United Nations Charter art. 73 states:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government, recognize the principle
that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the
utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of
these territories, and, to this end: … (e) to transmit regularly to the
Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic,
social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are
respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.
U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
24. Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73(e) of the
th
Charter in respect of Puerto Rico, G.A. Res. 748, U.N. GAOR, 8 Sess., Supp.
No. 17, at 25–26, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953).
25. 34 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 995 (1929).
26. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7.
27. Malavet, supra note 5, at 33. According to Malavet:
The amendments provided: (1) that students in private schools were
exempt from the compulsory public education requirement of Article
II, section 5, of the Puerto Rico constitution; (2) that Article II, section 20, of the proposed Puerto Rico constitution – a declaration of
Human Rights – should be eliminated; and (3) that Article VII, section 3, should have added to it language that essentially would require Congressional approval of amendments to the Puerto Rico constitution.
Id.
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The applicability of Federal legislation to Puerto Rico is governed by the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act (PRFRA).28 As
provided in Public Law 600, many provisions of the Jones Act of
1917 were repealed.29 The remaining provisions remained in
force as the PRFRA pursuant to the compact between Puerto
Rico and the United States Congress.30 Section 9 of the PRFRA
states in pertinent part that “the statutory laws of the United
States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect
in Puerto Rico as in the United States.”31
Section 9 has engendered a vast amount of litigation with
seemingly inconsistent results.32 In United States v. Quiñones,33
the first case in a line of challenges to the applicability of Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act34 (Omnibus Act) to the citizens of Puerto Rico, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the applicability of the Omnibus Act to Puerto
Rico.35 In Quiñones, the defendant challenged on appeal the
applicability of the Omnibus Act’s provision authorizing “a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication”36 between a government informant and a
28. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act, 64 Stat. 319 (1954) (codified in scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.).
29. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
30. Id.
31. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act § 9, 48 U.S.C. § 734 (2000) (emphasis
added).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1987)
(Clean Water Act applicable); United States v. Quiñones, 758 F. 2d 40 (1st
Cir. 1985) (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act applicable even in
light of Puerto Rico’s constitutional ban on wiretapping); United States v.
Tursi, 655 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1981) (Youth Corrections Act applicable); Liquilux
Gas Services of Ponce v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F. Supp. 414 (D. Puerto Rico
1969) (Robinson-Patman Act not applicable); Trigo Bros. Packing Corp. v.
Davis, 159 F. Supp. 841 (D. Puerto Rico 1958) (Federal Alcohol Administration Act not applicable); United States v. Figueroa-Rios, 140 F. Supp. 376 (D.
Puerto Rico 1956) (Federal Firearms Act not applicable).
33. Quiñones, 758 F.2d at 43 (defendant appealed his conviction of aiding
and abetting in the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The court
held that “[t]he Omnibus Crime Control Act is the controlling law for federal
prosecutions in Puerto Rico” and that “[t]he evidence of the recorded telephone
conversation was properly admitted.”).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (2000).
35. Quiñones, 758 F.2d at 43.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2000).
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37
criminal suspect. The court rejected Quiñones’ argument that
the Constitution of Puerto Rico should be viewed as a federal
statute and that its prohibition against wiretapping should control “because it has the force of federal law.”38 The court concluded, instead, that the “intent behind the approval of the
Puerto Rico Constitution was that the Constitution would operate to organize a local government and its adoption would in no
way alter the applicability of United States laws and federal
jurisdiction to Puerto Rico.”39
The same issue of the applicability of Title III of the Omnibus
Act to the citizens of Puerto Rico was revisited in subsequent
cases.40 In United States v. Gerena,41 the court once again ruled
that Title III of the Omnibus Act was not locally inapplicable to
Puerto Rico. In the process, however, the court acknowledged
that all federal law does not automatically apply to Puerto
Rico.42 The court concluded that federal laws would be locally
inapplicable to Puerto Rico in matters concerning purely local
issues.43
Finally, in 1989, the First Circuit revisited the issue, this
time in a civil context. In Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos
de Puerto Rico, the plaintiffs, some of the criminal defendants
in the Gerena case, sued two corporations that had assisted federal authorities in wiretapping the plaintiffs’ telephone calls.44
In its decision, once again upholding the applicability of Title
III of the Omnibus Act to Puerto Rico, the court nonetheless
noted that the “prohibition of wiretapping is an integral and
indispensable part of the definition of Puerto Ricans as a people
and a cornerstone of cultural values.”45 The court then stated

37. Quiñones, 758 F.2d at 40.
38. Id. at 41.
39. Id. at 43.
40. See generally Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de Puerto Rico, 868
F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1989) (civil case in which the court once again upheld the
validity of the application of Title III to Puerto Rico); United States v. Gerena,
649 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Conn. 1986).
41. Gerena, 649 F. Supp. at 1183.
42. Id. at 1186–87.
43. Id. at 1187.
44. Camacho, 868 F.2d at 484.
45. Id. at 486. See also Sean M. Morton, Death isn’t Welcome Here: Evaluating the Federal Death Penalty in the Context of a State Constitutional Objection to Capital Punishment, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1435, 1452 (2001).
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that Puerto Rico’s Constitution should be viewed as the equivalent of a state statute and that in matters in which federal and
state law conflict, federal law must govern.46
In part, as a result of these court decisions construing Section
9 to allow for the application to Puerto Rico of federal statutes
that conflict with the Commonwealth’s Constitution, federal
prosecutors in Puerto Rico continue to seek the death penalty in
cases arising mostly under the jurisdiction conferred to the federal courts by the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994.47
II. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1994
The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA) was passed as
part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1993.48 For the first time since the Supreme Court’s decision in
49
Furman v. Georgia, the national government created a new set
of procedural rules for implementing the federal death penalty.50 Along with the new procedural guidelines, the FDPA
also created new substantive crimes. 51 It also attached the
death penalty to crimes which previously did not include death
as a possible penalty.52
A. The New Procedural Guidelines of the FDPA
1. Notice of Intention to Seek the Death Penalty
The FDPA leaves the decision of whether to seek the death
penalty to the federal prosecutor’s discretion, based on the par-

46. Camacho, 868 F.2d at 488.
47. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 312, n.1 (citing Little, supra note
7, at 357 n.36 (“Because violent crime is unfortunately prevalent in Puerto
Rico, the local authorities have entered into a ‘Memorandum of Agreement’
with the local US Attorney’s office, agreeing that the federal authorities will
prosecute much of the ‘local’ violent crime, such as car-jackings, in Puerto
Rico.”)).
48. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103–322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
49. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
50. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1959–68 (1994) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 et seq. and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
51. Id. See also Morton, supra note 45, at 1440.
52. Id.
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53
Once the determination
ticular circumstances of each case.
that the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for a defendant is made, the government must provide the court and
the defendant with notice that it intends to seek the death penalty.54 Such notice must be provided within a “reasonable” time
before the beginning of the trial or before the court accepts a
guilty plea.55 It must also include the aggravating factors that
the prosecution will seek to prove in order to justify a death
sentence.56 The District Court of Puerto Rico held in United
States v. Colon-Miranda57 that the prosecution did not file its
notice of intent to seek the death penalty within a reasonable
time, where such notice was filed less than a week before the
trial was set to begin and the government had no justification
for its delay.58 Furthermore, the court took into account the fact
that the defendants would be prejudiced because they would be
unable to prepare an effective defense.59

2. The Sentencing Hearing
Once the government has filed its notice of intent to seek the
death penalty and the defendant has been found guilty at trial
of the capital crime(s) charged, the FDPA mandates a sentencing hearing.60 The sentencing hearing is to be conducted before
the same jury that determined the defendant’s guilt or, under
special circumstances, before a new jury.61 Ultimate discretion
62
as to the convicted defendant’s sentence rests with the jury.
At the sentencing hearing, the jury must make a threshold find-

53. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000). See also Nichols v. Reno, 931 F. Supp.
748, 752 (D.Colo. 1996) (“The death penalty statute gives prosecutorial discretion to the United States Attorney.”).
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a).
55. Id.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(2).
57. United States v. Colon-Miranda, 985 F. Supp. 36 (D.P.R. 1997).
58. Id. at 39.
59. Id.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b).
61. Id.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 3594 (2000). See also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
609 (2002) (the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial
by jury precludes a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, from finding an
aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty).
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ing of at least one aggravating factor out of a list of four statutorily-defined factors.63 The jury must find that the defendant:
(A) intentionally killed the victim; or
(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in
the death of the victim; or
(C) intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the
life of a person would be taken or intending that lethal force
would be used in connection with a person, other than one of
the participants in the offense, and the victim died as a result
of the act; or
(D) intentionally and specifically engaged in an act of violence,
knowing that the act created a grave risk of death to a person,
other than one of the participants in the offense, such that
participation in the act constituted a reckless disregard for
64
human life and the victim died as a result of the act.

In addition to one of these four aggravating factors, the jury
must also find at least one additional aggravating factor from
among the lists of factors defined in section 3592 of the FDPA.65
The prosecution may only present evidence as to the aggravating factors for which it has given notice to the defendant.66 The
government must select its aggravating factors from one of
three lists, depending on the type of crime that was committed.67 The aggravating factors for the homicide offenses include
sixteen factors, three for espionage or treason and eight for the
drug-related offenses.68
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (2000).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2000).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (“[T]he government may present any information
relevant to an aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under
subsection (a).”).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3592.
68. Id. Some of the factors for the homicide offenses are: when death occurs during the commission of another crime, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1); grave
risk of death to additional persons, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(5); heinous, cruel, or
depraved manner of committing offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6); and continuing criminal enterprise involving drug sales to minors, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(13).
Some of the factors for the drug-related offenses are: a previous serious drug
felony conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(d)(3); use of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §
3592(d)(4); and distribution to persons under 21, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(d)(5). The
three aggravating factors for espionage or treason are: (1) prior espionage or
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In addition to these statutorily-defined aggravating factors,
the jury may also consider the existence of any other nonstatutorily defined factors for which the government has given
notice.69 At the hearing, the government has the burden of
proving these aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, to
every juror.70 On the other hand, the burden of establishing the
existence of any mitigating factors rests on the defense.71 Furthermore, such factors must be proved only by a preponderance
of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.72
Section 3593 of the FDPA also provides the procedural guidelines to be followed at the sentencing hearing. As during the
trial, “the government shall open the argument [,] the defendant shall be permitted to reply [and] the government shall
then be permitted to reply in rebuttal.”73 The rules applicable to
the admissibility of evidence during trial do not apply to the
sentencing hearing.74 The FDPA specifies that parties may pretreason offense; or (2) grave risk to national security; or (3) grave risk of
death, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b)(1)-(3). Id.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3592. Several courts have considered the constitutionality
of non-statutory aggravating factors. In United States v. Llera Plaza, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the “nonstatutory aggravating factors [of the Federal Death Penalty Act] do not unconstitutionally limit and guide [the] discretion of the jury [so as to permit]
wholly arbitrary and capricious death sentences in violation of the Eight and
Fourteenth Amendments.” 179 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
71. Id. Carter and Kreitzberg define mitigation evidence as follows:
Offered in the penalty phase, evidence of mitigation provides reasons
why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Mitigating evidence comes in many varieties. For example, the defense might emphasize that the defendant played a minor role in the crime, the defendant had no prior criminal record, the defendant has lasting effects from an abusive childhood, the defendant has an underlying
mental disorder, the youth of the defendant, the defendant is remorseful for the crime, or that the defendant can live peaceably in
prison. As an element of the selection decision, mitigation allows for
the individualized consideration of the defendant. The life and circumstances of each defendant are considered in deciding whether
death or life is the appropriate sentence for a particular individual.
LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
LAW 137 (2004).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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sent any evidence that is relevant to the sentence, and that both
parties will be given a fair opportunity to develop their arguments pertaining to any mitigating or aggravating factors.75
The guidelines also specify the exclusion of evidence if “its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.”76
At the close of the sentencing hearing, the jury is required to
weigh the aggravating and the mitigating factors.77 The jurors
may impose a sentence of death, life imprisonment without parole, or another lesser sentence. If the jury opts for some other
sentence, the FDPA authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant to some lesser sentence78 according to federal sentencing
guidelines.79 The FDPA also requires that the death sentence
80
determination be by unanimous vote of the jurors.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). This section states:
[T]he jury, or if there is no jury, the court, shall consider whether all
the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh
all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence
of death, or in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of
death.
Id. In this respect, the FDPA is a weighing statute, which, instead of preventing the imposition of the death penalty in the presence of a mitigating factor,
allows the jurors to weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors when deciding whether to impose a sentence of death. Charles C. Boettcher, Note, Testing the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 USC §§ 3591th
3598 (1994): United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5 Cir. 1998), 29 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1043, 1072 (1998).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3594.
79. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3595 sets out the guidelines for appeal by a defendant
sentenced to death. 18 U.S.C. § 3595 (2000). For a discussion of the process of
appellate review, as well as a discussion of a fairly recent challenge to the
FDPA, see generally Boettcher, supra note 77.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (“[T]he jury by unanimous vote, or if there is no
jury, the court, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced
to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other
lesser sentence.”).
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B. Crimes Subject to the Federal Death Penalty
The Federal Death Penalty Act is applicable to three categories of crimes.81 First, the FDPA creates entirely new federal
offenses, such as murder by a federal prisoner and use of weapons of mass destruction.82 Second, the FDPA authorizes the
death penalty for pre-existing federal offenses which were not
previously punishable by death.83 Finally, the FDPA applies its
81. Boettcher, supra note 77, at 1058 (“It has been said that the FDPA
created over sixty new death eligible crimes. However, the FDPA did not create sixty death eligible crimes, but actually created only around twenty new
death eligible crimes.”). Boettcher clarifies that while the FDPA did create a
few federal crimes, its major effect was to make its procedural provisions applicable to existing federal offenses, making them eligible for a penalty of
death. Id.
82. Little, supra note 7, at 391 n.237. Other newly-created federal offenses
include:
[D]rive-by shooting, § 60008 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994)); foreign murder of U.S. nationals, § 60009, 108 Stat. 1972 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1119 (1994)); murder by escaped [life] prisoners, § 60012,
108 Stat. 1973 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1120 (1994)); killing persons
assisting federal investigations, § 60015, 108 Stat. 1974 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994)); retaliatory killings of witnesses, victims,
and informants, § 60017, 108 Stat. 1975 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1513(a) (1994)); violence against maritime navigation and fixed platforms, § 60019, 108 Stat. 1975–79 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2280, 2281
(1994)); violence at international airports, § 60021, 108 Stat. 1979–80
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1994)).
Id.
83. Id. Some of these pre-existing offenses include:
Civil rights offenses and conspiracies, § 60006, 108 Stat. 1970–71, 18
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245(b), 247(c) (1994) (focused on religious persecution); murder of a federal law enforcement official, § 60007, 108 Stat.
1971, 18 U.S.C § 1114 (1994); sexual abuse and child molestation, §
60010, 108 Stat. 1972–1973, 18 U.S.C. § 2245 (1994) (penalty); sexual
exploitation of children, § 60011, 108 Stat. 1973, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)
(1994); gun murders during crimes of violence or drug trafficking, §
60013, 108 Stat. 1973, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) (penalty); possession of dangerous weapons in, or attack upon, a federal facility, §
60014, 108 Stat. 1973, 18 U.S.C. § 930 (1994); obstruction of justice
(“protection of court officers and jurors”), § 60016, 108 Stat. 1974, 18
U.S.C. § 1503 (1994); murder of federal witnesses, § 60018, 108 Stat.
1975, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A) (1994); terrorist death penalty act. §
60022, 108 Stat. 1980, 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a)(1) (1994); and, alien
smuggling, § 60024, 108 Stat. 1981–82, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1994).
Id. at 391 n.238.
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procedural guidelines to crimes which were previously eligible
for the death penalty but whose death penalty provisions had
been invalidated by the decision in Furman.84 These death penalty provisions had never been removed from the Code nor
amended. The FDPA effectively brought them back to life.85
III. A CHALLENGE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE FDPA TO
PUERTO RICO: THE ACOSTA-MARTINEZ CASES
The applicability of the FDPA to the citizens of Puerto Rico
was challenged by two federal defendants charged with capital
murder under the FDPA.86 The District Court of Puerto Rico
granted the defendants’ motion to strike the death penalty certification based on the fact that, inter alia, Congress did not
make the FDPA explicitly applicable to Puerto Rico.87 The First
Circuit, however, reversed the District Court’s decision, and
found that the statutes defining the substantive crimes the defendants were charged with explicitly applied to Puerto Rico.88
While Judge Casellas of the District Court acknowledged in a
footnote that “a germane issue would be whether customary
international law forbids the application of capital punishment
in Puerto Rico,”89 neither the District Court nor the Circuit
Court considered whether the application of the federal death
penalty to citizens of Puerto Rico violates any norm of regional
customary law.
84. Boettcher, supra note 77, at 1058–59. Boettcher states:
Approximately seventeen of these referenced crimes were already eligible for imposition of the death penalty prior to the enactment of the
FDPA. The statutes which make these crimes eligible for death, appropriately referred to as “zombie statutes” because of their dormant
nature after Furman, were effectively revived from their “NeverNever Land” by the FDPA…Although the FDPA did make some new
crimes death eligible, its most impacting effect on federal death penalty jurisprudence is its codification of procedures for the imposition
of the death penalty which comport with the constitutional requirements outlined by the Supreme Court.
Id.
85. Id.
86. See generally Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311.
87. Id. at 318.
88. United States v. Acosta Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Acosta Martinez II].
89. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 313 n.6.
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A. Background of the Acosta-Martinez Cases
On June 2, 1999 defendants Hector Oscar Acosta-Martinez
and Joel Rivera- Alejandro were charged with firearm murder
in relation to a crime of violence90 and killing a person in retaliation for providing law enforcement officials with information relating to the possible commission of a federal offense,91
92
both punishable by death under the FDPA. Subsequent to the
U.S. Attorney General’s authorization on January 24, 2000, the
United States Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico filed the
notice that the office intended to seek the death penalty in the
event of a conviction.93
On May 17, 2000 the defendants filed a motion to declare the
federal death penalty inapplicable in Puerto Rico. The defendants argued, among other things, that the federal death penalty is “locally inapplicable” to Puerto Rico under Section 9 of
the PRFRA due to the Puerto Rico Constitution’s explicit ban on
capital punishment.94 The defendants also argued that applying
the federal death penalty to citizens of Puerto Rico would be
unfair due to their lack of representation in enacting federal
law and thus, their lack of consent to this law in particular.95
B. The District Court of Puerto Rico Decision in Acosta-Martinez
On July 17, 2000 District Court Judge Casellas granted
Acosta-Martinez and Rivera-Alejandro’s motion to strike the
96
death penalty certification. The district court based its deci90. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (2000). Acosta Martinez I, 106 F.
Supp. 2d at 312.
91. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B) (2000). Acosta Martinez I, 106
F. Supp. 2d at 312.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 312. The defendants’ other arguments included an argument
that even if Puerto Rico’s Constitution were to be considered a federal statute,
it could not be unilaterally altered by Congress. The court rejected this argument by stating that the theory had been previously rejected by the court and
by citing United States v. Quiñones, discussed supra. The court, ruling for
defendants based on their first and third arguments did not reach defendants’
fourth argument that applying the federal death penalty to Puerto Rico violated Article X of the Treaty of Paris, which guaranteed the inhabitants of
Puerto Rico the freedom to exercise their religion. Id. at 312–13.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 327.
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sion on two grounds. First, the court cited the First Circuit
Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Quiñones.97 However, the district court distinguished that case based on “two
important elements.”98 The first element was “the fundamental
principle that death is different.”99 The court, quoting from the
100
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, emphasized
the uniqueness of the death penalty in its “irrevocability,” its
“rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of
criminal justice,” and its “absolute renunciation of all that is
embodied in our concept of humanity.”101 The court distinguished the case before it from Quiñones on the ground that
death is fundamentally and qualitatively different from any
other type of punishment.102 As such, the court held that the
administration of the death penalty requires a higher degree of
fairness, consistency, and reliability.103
Second, the court considered the language of the Federal
Death Penalty Act and Congressional intent with regard to its
applicability to Puerto Rico.104 It stated that, while the Omnibus Act at issue in Quiñones specifically extends to Puerto
Rico,105 the FDPA does not.106 The court noted that while the
Omnibus Act expressly mentions the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico in its definition of “state” for purposes of that act, the
FDPA merely mentions Puerto Rico to include it “in a geographical sense” in the definition of “United States” for certain
maritime offenses only.107 The court reasoned:
However, on a matter as unique and extreme as the death
penalty, the mention of Puerto Rico exclusively in the context
97. See discussion supra Part I.
98. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
99. Id.
100. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
101. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 318 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at
306 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Omnibus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2000) (“[A]s used in this chapter
‘state’ means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United
States.”).
106. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
107. Id. at 319.
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of these maritime offenses, cannot reasonably be taken as Congress’s manifest intention that the FDPA not fall within the
“not locally inapplicable” provision set forth in section 9, particularly in view of the Commonwealth Constitution’s prohibition against capital punishment. The extraordinary nature of
capital punishment requires a higher degree of clarity and
precision. Reason and common sense dictate that had Congress intended to apply the death penalty in the Commonwealth, it would have done so by the plain declaration, and
108
would not have left it to mere inference.

The court then went on to discuss the context in which the
Commonwealth drafted and the U.S. Congress approved the
109
Puerto Rican Constitution. The court noted that the Framers,
in enshrining Puerto Rico’s prohibition of the death penalty in
its highest document, were acting on the Puerto Rican people’s
“firm cultural, moral and religious convictions.”110 Judge Casellas also noted that Congress conditioned its approval of the constitution on several amendments, and that Congress had not
required the elimination of Puerto Rico’s ban on the death penalty embodied in Article 2, Section 7.111 Therefore, Puerto Rican
citizens’ expectations that the death penalty would not exist
under the Puerto Rico-United States compact were reasonable.112
The court summarized its finding that the FDPA is inapplicable to Puerto Rico in five short points: (1) Commonwealth
status was established in Puerto Rico in order to promote and
develop self-government and enhance Puerto Rico’s autonomy;
(2) by accepting Public Law 600, the people of Puerto Rico ac108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 319–20.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 320–21; Malavet, supra note 5, at 33. Malavet states:

The amendments provided: (1) that students in private schools were
exempt from the compulsory public education requirement of Article
II, section 5, of the Puerto Rico constitution; (2) that Article II, section 20, of the proposed Puerto Rico constitution – a declaration of
Human Rights – should be eliminated; and (3) that Article VII, section 3, should have added to it language that essentially would require Congressional approval of amendments to the Puerto Rico constitution.
Id.
112. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
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cepted Section 9 of the PRFRA which makes clear that federal
law that is not locally inapplicable, applies to Puerto Rico; (3)
the Commonwealth’s Constitution explicitly prohibits the death
penalty in Puerto Rico; (4) the culture, values and traditions of
the Puerto Rican people all reject the death penalty; and (5)
Congress did not explicitly extend the FDPA to Puerto Rico.113
The district court went on to state that even if Congress explicitly declared its intent to make the FDPA applicable to
Puerto Rico, such application “would not comport with the exigencies of substantive due process.”114 The court then discussed
in detail the history of the adoption of the Commonwealth Constitution as embodying the principle of government by consent.115 The court explained that, for the first time, through the
compact and through Section 9 of the PRFRA, the Puerto Rican
people agreed to be governed by federal laws that were not locally inapplicable even though they did not have any participation in their enactment.116
In the case of Puerto Rican federal relations, the court said
that the principle of government by consent is eroding because
of the “widening sphere of federal authority, which has ex113. Id.
114. Id. at 321–22.
115. Id. at 322. The court also remarked that the FDPA expressly acknowledges the principle of government by consent by establishing special provisions for Indian Country:
No person subject to the criminal jurisdiction of an Indian tribal government shall be subject to a capital sentence under this chapter for
any offense the Federal jurisdiction for which is predicated solely on
Indian country…and which has occurred within the boundaries of Indian country, unless the governing body of the tribe has elected that
this chapter have effect over land and persons subject to its criminal
jurisdiction.
Id. at 325 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3598 (2000) (emphasis in original)).
116. Id. at 322. The Court pointed out that:
Puerto Ricans residing in Puerto Rico do not vote for the President of
the United States, nor do they elect senators or representatives to the
United States Congress, except for a non-voting Resident Commissioner for Puerto Rico who sits in the House of Representatives. The
Resident Commissioner can vote in the Congressional committees to
which he is assigned, see Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule
XII, but he cannot cast a final vote on legislation proposed in the
House.
Id. at 322 n.37.
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panded without local participation, and the concomitant reduction in the sphere of commonwealth authority.”117 The court
then differentiated between applying, on the basis of the “generic consent” given in Section 9 of the PRFRA, federal laws
aimed at furthering the common good118 and a federal law which
119
The court held that the
allows for the “deprivation of life.”
latter application is unreasonable, unfair, directly cuts against
the principle of government by consent, violates the substantive
due process rights of the American citizens of Puerto Rico,120
and “constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights to liberty
and life of the American citizens of Puerto Rico.”121 The court
ultimately granted the defendants’ motion to strike the death
penalty certification and the prosecution appealed that decision
to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
C. The First Circuit’s Decision in Acosta-Martinez
After holding that it had appellate jurisdiction to hear the
case before it,122 the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered
the issue of whether Congress intended the federal death penalty to apply to Puerto Rico.123 The Court of Appeals found that
the district court erred in focusing on the language of the FDPA
rather than on the language of the substantive statutes which
define the crimes with which the defendants were charged.124

117. Id. at 324.
118. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 326 n.47. See, e.g., United States
v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 1515 (1st Cir. 1987) (Clean Water Act); Caribtow v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Com’n, 493 F.2d 1064 (1st Cir. 1974)
(Occupational Safety and Health Act).
119. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
120. Id. at 325.
121. Id. at 326 (emphasis in original).
122. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 16–17. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s order under the Criminal Appeals Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3731. Id. According to the court of appeals, the district court had,
by striking a statutorily authorized penalty, “effectively dismissed a significant portion of the counts against the defendants.” Id. at 17. The court also
noted that the district court’s order affected more than merely the sentence; it
materially affected the conduct of trial. Id. The court also concluded that the
case before it also fell under its mandamus jurisdiction. Id.
123. Id. at 15.
124. Id. at 19. The court stated that while it accepted “the strength of
Puerto Rico’s interest and its moral and cultural sentiment against the death
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The FDPA, the court said, does not provide for the death penalty in and of itself.125 Instead, it merely provides a set of procedural rules to be followed before capital punishment is imposed.126 As the source of the penalty, the court instead looked
to the substantive statutes which define the crimes and their
punishments.127
The court first looked at the language of 18 U.S.C. §924(j) under which the defendants were charged with firearm murder in
relation to a crime of violence, then at 18 U.S.C. §1515(a)(1)(B),
the basis for the defendant’s retaliatory killing charge.128 The
court noted that both provisions punish those crimes with penalties that include the death penalty and that both crimes “and
the consequent penalties are explicitly made applicable to
Puerto Rico.”129 The court cited 18 U.S.C. §921130 as evidence
that the firearms murder offense is explicitly applicable to
Puerto Rico and cited 18 U.S.C. §1513(d)131 to show that “the
retaliatory killing offense applies not only within the United
States, but also explicitly has “extraterritorial reach.”132 Additionally, the court stated that the federal criminal code itself is
explicitly made applicable to Puerto Rico because the territorial

penalty; the legal issue for the court is still one of what Congress intended.”
Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 19.
130. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2) states:
The term “interstate or foreign commerce” includes commerce between any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or
within any possession of the United States (not including the Canal
Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not include
commerce between places within the same State but through any
place outside of that State. The term “state” includes the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of
the United States (not including the Canal Zone.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2) (2000).
131. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(d) states that
“there is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1513(d) (2000).
132. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 19.
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definition of United States, for the purposes of the criminal
codes, expressly includes Puerto Rico.133
The court further stated that the fact that Congress included
Puerto Rico in its definition of state in the new maritime offenses it enacted along with the FDPA is also indicative of Congressional “intent to apply the death penalty in the statutes
which define the crime and penalty and not in a procedural
statute.”134 As the constitutions of the fifty states only govern
proceedings in state courts, so, too, the Constitution of Puerto
Rico only governs matters in the Commonwealth courts. Accordingly, the court concluded that Congress intended that the
federal death penalty apply to federal criminal prosecutions in
Puerto Rico.135
The court then turned to the district court’s constitutional determination that the application of the federal death penalty to
U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico violated defendants’
substantive due process rights.136 The court claimed that the
“shocking to the conscience test”137 used to test executive action
138
The court cited a string of cases
was not met in this case.
which held federal law applicable to Puerto Rico and then
stated that “it cannot shock the conscience of the court to apply
to Puerto Rico, as intended by Congress, a federal penalty for a
federal crime which Congress has applied to the fifty states.”139
The court went on to say that with the power to apply federal
criminal laws to Puerto Rico comes the power to attach penal-

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21. The Court in Furman explained that:

In judging whether or not a given penalty is morally acceptable, most
courts have said that the punishment is valid unless it shocks the
conscience and sense of justice of the people… [W]hether or not a
punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its mere
mention shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people, but
on whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the
penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust,
and unacceptable.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 360–61.
138. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 21.
139. Id.
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140
ties to them. The court also found that it would be anomalous
to grant U.S. citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico without
affording them the protection of the federal criminal laws.141

IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE FDPA TO PUERTO RICO AS A
VIOLATION OF REGIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW
While there are differing views as to whether abolition of the
death penalty has become a norm of customary international
142
law, there is ample evidence to suggest that it has at the least
become a norm of regional customary law in the Latin American
region.143 Latin American countries have been at the forefront
of the movement towards universal abolition of the death penalty,144 and the evidence strongly suggests that these countries
have engaged in the practice of abolition with the opinio juris145
necessary for the development of a norm of regional customary
law.146 On this basis, the application of the Federal Death Penalty to citizens of Puerto Rico clearly violates regional customary law.
A. Customary International Law in Brief 147
The Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law § 102 defines a rule of international law as one “that has been accepted
as such by the international community of states (a) in the form
of customary international law; (b) by international agreement;
or (c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world.”148 The Restatement further ex140. Id. at 20.
141. Id. at 21.
142. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH
rd
PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press, 3 ed. 2002)
(1993); Michelle McKee, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: Understanding why the State’s Use of the Death Penalty Violates Customary International
Law, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 153 (2000).
143. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
144. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 311.
145. See definition of opinio juris infra Part IV.A.
146. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
147. See generally CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965).
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(1) (1987). See
also Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which
provides:
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plains that a binding rule of customary international law results from the consistent general practice of states,149 followed
150
out of a sense of legal obligation.
The comments to Section 102 of the Restatement note that
state practice may take numerous forms, and that there is no
requisite duration for such practice as long as it is “general and
consistent.”151 Different forms of state practice include “diplomatic contacts and correspondence; public statements of government officials; legislative and executive acts; military manuals and actions by military commanders; treaties and executive
agreements; decisions of international and national courts and
tribunals; and decisions, declarations, and resolutions of international organizations, among many others.”152

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as
law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1031.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987). The
word “state” in the context of international law has been defined as follows:
As stated in the 1933 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
(the Montevideo Convention), concluded among 16 states in the
Western hemisphere, “[t]he state as a person of international law
should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 109 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al. eds.
2002).
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, cmt. b (1987).
See also INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 74.
152. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 74
(“State practice also includes inaction, at least in circumstances in which a
state’s failure to object to actions by another state may imply acquiescence in
those actions.”).
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State practice alone does not constitute customary international law.153 In order for a state practice to become a rule of
customary international law, states that engage in the practice
must do so out of a sense of legal obligation which is referred to
as opinio juris sive necessitatis or simply opinio juris.154 Since
states usually do not refer to international law when acting, it
is necessary to infer the opinio juris from the circumstances and
the nature of the state practice itself.155
Finally, there are circumstances, such as those which exist
with relation to the death penalty in the Latin American region,
in which the practice of states within a regional or other special
grouping can result in the existence of “special,” “regional” or
“particular customary law” for those states.156
B. The Abolition of the Death Penalty as a Norm of Regional
157
Customary Law in the Latin American Region
The abolition of the death penalty has become a general and
158
consistent practice among Latin American states. Some Latin
153. Id. at 75.
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, cmt. c (1987);
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 75.
155. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 75.
“It is often difficult to determine when the transformation into law has taken
place. Explicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official statements) is not necessary; opinio juris may be inferred from acts or omissions.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, cmt. c (1987).
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, cmt. e (1987).
157. There are differing views as to whether the abolition of the death penalty has become a norm of customary international law. For an overview of
the current status of abolition in international law and for the view that the
abolition of the death penalty has yet to reach the level of customary international law, see generally SCHABAS, supra note 142. See also Anthony N.
Bishop, The Death Penalty in the United States: An International Human
Rights Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1147 (2002). Bishop states:
While 111 countries have abolished capital punishment de jure or de
facto, it is still too soon to claim that the use of the death penalty in
general is prohibited by customary international law. There are still
large regions of the world where the death penalty is widely used
even for the most minor offenses.
Id. For the argument that abolition of the death penalty is a norm of customary law and that the United States’ use of the death penalty violates that law,
see Michelle McKee, supra note 142.
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American states abolished the death penalty as early as the
nineteenth century and early twentieth century.159 In fact,
Latin American states such as Uruguay and Venezuela have
played a crucial role within the United Nations by advocating
for the abolition of the death penalty.160 Many Latin American
countries’ constitutions either limit the scope of the death penalty or abolish it completely.161 According to a study by Roger
Hood, “the hundred year tradition of abolition in South America
now holds sway over almost all of the region.”162
163

1. The American Convention on Human Rights

Drawing on the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of
164
and the European Convention on Human
Human Rights
165
Rights, the Organization of American States adopted the

158. See Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2 infra for a discussion of relevant state
actions which amount to general practice under customary international law.
159. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 311. Venezuela abolished the death penalty in 1863, Costa Rica in 1877, Brazil in 1882, Panama in 1903, Ecuador in
1906, Uruguay in 1907 and Colombia in 1910. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. The language of some of these countries’ constitutions is as follows:
Colombia (1886), art. 29: “The legislature may not impose capital
punishment in any case;” Costa Rica (1871), art. 45: “Human life is
inviolable in Costa Rica;” Ecuador (1946), art. 187: “The state shall
guarantee to the inhabitants of Ecuador: (1) the sanctity of human
life: there shall be no death penalty;” Panama (1946), art. 30: “There
is no penalty of death, expatriation, or confiscation of property;” Uruguay (1934), art. 25: “The penalty of death shall not be inflicted on
any person.”
Id. at n.3.
162. ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY, A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 43–44
nd
(2 ed. 1996) cited in SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 311.
163. For a discussion of some of the decisions of the Inter American Court
and commissions regarding the death penalty and for a general discussion of
the Inter American Human Rights System, see generally SCHABAS, supra note
142, and Richard J. Wilson, The United States’ Position on the Death Penalty
in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1159
(2002).
164. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR,
rd
3 Sess., pt. 1, Resolutions at 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
165. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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166
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in
1948, followed by the American Convention on Human Rights167
168
In all, through Article 4 of the American
in the late 1960’s.
Convention, international law prohibits sixteen Central and
South American states from imposing the death penalty.169 Inspired by the above-mentioned documents, Article 4 states:

1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and pursuant
to a final judgment rendered by a competent court and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted
prior to the commission of the crime. The application of such
punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does
not presently apply.
3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that
have abolished it.
4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political
offenses or related common crimes.
5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons
who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18
years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be applied to
170
pregnant women.
6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to
apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which
may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be

166. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Mar. 30-May 2,
1948, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V/I.4 (1965).
167. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123, O.A.S.T.S. 36 (1979).
168. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 312.
169. Id. at 353.
170. For the argument that the United States is in breach of international
law, see Rachel J. Avery, “Killing Kids Who Kill” – An International Perspective on the Juvenile Death Penalty, 7 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 303
(2002-2003). The Supreme Court recently held that the execution of juveniles
is unconstitutional. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005)
(holding execution of juveniles unconstitutional).
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imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the com171
petent authority.

Although inspired by previously adopted international in172
the American Declaration’s standards on the
struments,
death penalty are much more radical than those of its predecessors.173 In fact, the drafters of the Convention were the first to
promote the idea of implementing an additional protocol that
would altogether abolish the death penalty in the region.174

2. The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty
In 1990, the Inter-American human rights system of the Organization of American States adopted and later gave effect to
the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
175
The Protocol states in
Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty.
part:
The State Parties to this Protocol
Considering:
That Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights
recognizes the right to life and restricts the application of the
death penalty;
That everyone has the inalienable right to respect for his life,
a right that cannot be suspended for any reason;
171. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 167, at art. 4.
172. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights merely states: “Everyone
has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.” Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, supra note 164, at art. 3. Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.” European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 165.
173. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 350 (“By the inclusion of Article 4 § 3, the
Convention is in fact abolitionist for those State parties – and they are the
majority in the Organization of American States – that have abolished the
death penalty in their internal legislation.”).
174. Id.
175. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to
Abolish the Death Penalty, Aug. 28, 1991, 29 I.L.M. 1447, O.A.S.T.S. 73.
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That the tendency among the American States is to be in favour of abolition of the death penalty;
…
That an international agreement must be arrived at that will
entail a progressive development of the American Convention
on Human Rights; and
That States Parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights have expressed their intention to adopt an international agreement with a view to consolidating the practice of
not applying the death penalty in the Americas.
…
Article 1
The State parties to this Protocol shall not apply the death
penalty in their territory to any person subject to their juris176
diction.

The Protocol does not allow for reservations,177 except to reserve the right to apply the death penalty in wartime.178 The six
countries that signed the protocol at adoption are Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela.179 To
date, nine states have ratified the Protocol; the United States
clearly not one of them.180

176. Id.
177. In the case where one or more states refuses to accept all of a treaty’s
provisions while still wishing to become a party to a multilateral treaty, the
state “may seek to enter a reservation to the treaty to limit or exclude the
application of one or more of the treaty’s terms to the reserving state, provided
that the treaty does not expressly prohibit the reservation at issue.”
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 65.
178. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to
Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 175, at art. 2(1).
179. Anthony N. Bishop, The Death Penalty in the United States: An International Human Rights Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1145 n.223
(2002).
180. Organization of American States, Signatories and Ratifications of the
Inter American Treaties, at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-53.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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3. The Requisite Opinio Juris
While the international agreements discussed above are dispositive evidence of a general and consistent practice of abolition of the death penalty among Latin American states, their
widespread acceptance by Latin American countries is also evidence that these states have acted with the requisite opinio juris necessary for the creation of a norm of customary law. The
mere fact that there remains only one Latin American country,
Guatemala, which continues to employ the death penalty,181 is
strong evidence that those states that have abolished the death
penalty have done so out of a sense of legal obligation.
The opinio juris for the abolition of the death penalty in Latin
America can also be inferred from some of the language used in
reservations to the treaties and in the language of the treaties
themselves.182 In its reservation to the American Convention on
Human Rights, the Dominican Republic stated that “[t]he Dominican Republic, upon signing the American Convention on
Human Rights, aspires that the principle pertaining to the abolition of the death penalty shall become purely and simply that,
with general application throughout the states of the American
Region.”183 It can be inferred from this language that the Dominican Republic, in signing onto the Convention, did so out of
a sense of legal obligation and that it expected other countries
in the American Region to subscribe to the principle now codified in the Convention that the death penalty ought to be abolished.
Furthermore, the language in the preamble of the Additional
Protocol is also evidence of the necessary opinio juris. It can be
inferred from the statement that the “State Parties to the
American Convention on Human Rights have expressed their
intention to adopt an international agreement with a view to
consolidating the practice of not applying the death penalty in
the Americas”184 that the signatories were acting out of a sense
181. See McKee, supra note 142, at 159 (“It is also important to realize that
among North America, South America, Central America and Western Europe;
the United States, Guyana, Guatemala and Belize are the only non-conformist
nations.”).
182. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 75.
183. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 436–37.
184. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to
Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 175 (emphasis added).
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of legal obligation and with the goal of codifying a practice that
was already in existence among them.
4. The United States Violates Regional Customary Law by Imposing the Death Penalty on the Citizens of Puerto Rico
In 1953, in response to the United States Memorandum to
the United Nations concerning the Cessation of Transmission of
Information regarding Puerto Rico,185 the United Nations’ General Assembly passed Resolution 748. The resolution stated, in
pertinent part, “that the agreement reached by the United
States of America and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, in
forming a political association which respects the individuality
and the cultural characteristics of Puerto Rico, maintains the
spiritual bonds between Puerto Rico and Latin America and
constitutes a link in continental solidarity.”186
This resolution evidences the importance that the international community places on the development of regional systems and on the incorporation into those systems of countries
with similar cultures and beliefs. The almost unanimous abolition of the death penalty in the Latin American region is a result of those countries’ moral, cultural, and religious respect for
human life.187 As discussed supra, in incorporating the abolition
of the death penalty into the Commonwealth’s Constitution, the
Framers “were acting upon the people of Puerto Rico’s firm cultural, moral and religious conviction against the death penalty.”188
By imposing the federal death penalty on the citizens of
Puerto Rico, the United States has acted and continues to act in
opposition to General Assembly Resolution 748.189 The United
States continues to disregard the “individuality and cultural
characteristics”190 that led Puerto Rico to definitively abolish the
death penalty in its Constitution. Furthermore, and most im185. See Memorandum Concerning Transmission of Information, supra note
21. See also Malavet, supra note 5.
186. Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73(e) of the
Charter in respect of Puerto Rico, supra note 24.
187. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 350.
188. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
189. Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73 (e) of the
Charter in respect of Puerto Rico, supra note 24.
190. Id.
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portantly for the purposes of the present discussion, the United
States is ignoring the “spiritual bond”191 or “link in continental
192
solidarity” which exists between Puerto Rico and the rest of
the Latin American region. By continuously seeking the death
penalty against citizens of Puerto Rico, the United States is violating the norm of regional customary law that has developed in
the Latin American region, which upholds respect for the right
to life and prohibits imposition of the death penalty.193
CONCLUSION
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico states:
“[s]e reconoce como derecho fundamental del ser humano el derecho a la vida, a la libertad, y al disfrute de la propiedad. No
existirá la pena de muerte. Ninguna persona será privada de su
libertad, o propiedad, sin el debido proceso de ley, ni se negará a
persona alguna en Puerto Ricota igual protección de las leyes.”194
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, like so
many of the constitutions of other Latin American countries,195
clearly and explicitly prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on its citizens. In fact, as recently as 1991, the people of
Puerto Rico once again expressed their abhorrence for the death
penalty when they voted against a proposed constitutional
amendment that would have changed § 7 of the Puerto Rico
Constitution to allow for the death penalty in cases of repeat
first degree murder and multiple murders committed during
the same act.196 The rejection of the constitutional amendment
by the people of Puerto Rico shows that Puerto Rico’s long-

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See discussion supra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2.
194. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7 (“Recognizing the fundamental rights to life,
liberty and property. The death penalty shall not exist. No person shall be
deprived of liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person in Puerto Rico be denied equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added).
195. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
196. Juan Alberto Soto Gonzalez & Juan Carlos Rivera Rodríguez, La Pena
de Muerte, Una Batalla entre una Ley Federal y la Constitución de Puerto
Rico, 41 REV. DER. P.R. 253, 257–58 (2002) (Title translates as “The Death
Penalty, A Battle between a Federal Law and the Constitution of Puerto Rico”).
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standing sentiments against capital punishment remain very
strong even in modern times.
While the new procedural and sentencing guidelines introduced by the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994197 effectively
cure many of the constitutional problems denounced by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, they continue to defy and
violate the will of the people of Puerto Rico as well as the norm
of customary law developed in the Latin American Region.198
The Supreme Court of the United States has yet to address the
issue of the applicability of the FDPA to citizens of Puerto
Rico,199 but will have to eventually, as the Department of Justice
continues to seek the death penalty in a large number of federal
prosecutions in Puerto Rico.200
The Supreme Court, like the District Court of Puerto Rico
and the First Circuit Court of Appeals,201 is likely to focus on
domestic issues of applicability of federal legislation to Puerto
Rico. However, in order to comply with regional customary law,
either Congress or the Court itself will have to address the issue and declare the Federal Death Penalty Act inapplicable to
Puerto Rico as a violation of regional customary law.

Monique Marie Gallien*

197. See discussion supra Part II.
198. See discussion supra Part IV.
199. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of Acosta Martinez.
Acosta-Martinez v. United States, 533 U.S. 906 (2002).
200. Little, supra note 7, at 357 n.36 (“The Puerto Rico U.S. Attorney’s office
has submitted the largest number of potential death penalty cases (59) of any
of the 94 federal districts since the Capital Case Review protocol was issued in
1995.”).
201. See discussion of Acosta Martinez cases supra Part III.
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